Monday, November 21, 2005
On Universals and Particulars
When I was a philosophy major I got to read all sorts of interesting things. But one course in particular was boring.
There is a concept in philosophy called "universals." What makes blue blue even though there are different shades? A duck a duck even though no duck is the same? Some things enbody a class or type.
Many people argue over whether universals exist or not. Why? Who cares? I didn't.
And, now, I realize why they were arguing about this stuff.
Universals are immaterial. But we know they exist. A person can see the color blue in many different places. And, if you are an atheist, you can't account for the fact that something immaterial, like the concept of blue, exists. You don't believe in immaterial things.
An easier solution that would result in less arguing would be just to allow for immaterial thing to exist. And if that is inconsistent with materialistic atheism so be it.
When I was a philosophy major I got to read all sorts of interesting things. But one course in particular was boring.
There is a concept in philosophy called "universals." What makes blue blue even though there are different shades? A duck a duck even though no duck is the same? Some things enbody a class or type.
Many people argue over whether universals exist or not. Why? Who cares? I didn't.
And, now, I realize why they were arguing about this stuff.
Universals are immaterial. But we know they exist. A person can see the color blue in many different places. And, if you are an atheist, you can't account for the fact that something immaterial, like the concept of blue, exists. You don't believe in immaterial things.
An easier solution that would result in less arguing would be just to allow for immaterial thing to exist. And if that is inconsistent with materialistic atheism so be it.
